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Introduction 
Have more than thou showest, 
Speak less than thou knowest, 
Lend less than thou owest. 
-William  Shakespeare, 
King Lear 
(Act I, sc. iv, line 132) 
Should the Federal Reserve -  or any other 
government agency -  make precise statements 
about its policy objectives? Determining the 
proper amount of secrecy in government gen- 
erates controversy whether the agency involved 
undertakes espionage, banking, or monetary 
policy. Between the broad areas of agreement 
(classifying military strategies, publishing legis- 
lation) lie equally broad areas of contention. 
This article explores the economic reasons 
why a government agency may find it in its 
own -  and society's -  interest to be vague 
about policy objectives. Circumstances arise in 
which it is optimal for agencies to release only 
partial information about their decisions. For 
that reason, vagueness, and the secrecy neces- 
sary to preserve it, represent an accommoda- 
tion with an imperfect world rather than a 
conspiracy of  silence. 
Joseph G. Haubrich is an econo- 
mist and consultant at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The 
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Unlike complaints about the Central Intelli- 
gence Agency or the National Security Agency, 
the objections against banking and monetary 
authorities center not around a total lack of pub- 
lic announcements, but around the vagueness of 
their policy statements. Thls results from three re- 
lated but separable policies: closed meetings, 
delayed release of  decisions and minutes, and 
uninformative releases. Immediate release of  a 
videotaped meeting may matter little if the poli- 
cies agreed upon remain vague and imprecise, 
while a blacked-out, highly secret meeting 
could in principle result in detailed, precise 
statements of  policy. 
In the area of  banking regulation, Irvine 
Sprague, a former director of  the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), described his am- 
biguity about announcing which banks were too 
big to fail: "Comptroller  Todd Conover hinted 
that the eleven largest banks in the nation were 
immune from failure. In my Boston speech, I 
iden~ied  the top two as being absolutely safe. 
The right number is elusive."' 
1  See Sprague (l986),  p. 259. Closure policy is not the only area where 
banking rules seem vague, nor do regulators 
have a monopoly on ambiguity. Regulatory en- 
forcement of commercial lending standards - 
a serious concern during the last recession -  has 
also been criticized for imprecision (McLemore 
[19911). In the realm of monetary policy, Con- 
gressman Henry B. Gonzalez, former chairman 
of the House Banking Committee, has called 
for videotaping Federal Open Market Cornmit- 
tee (FOMC) meetings and for the immediate re- 
lease of  monetary policy objectives. Outside 
the government, credit-rating agencies do not 
always announce precise standards for each 
rating (Hansel1 [1993]). More recently, both 
types of  ambiguity have surfaced in the area of 
derivatives. There is apparently still some un- 
certainty about how regulators will treat bank 
investment in derivatives (Karr and Gaylord 
119941) and about what banks will tell their cus- 
tomers (Tomasula [19941). 
In this article, I explore the concept techni- 
cally known as "cheap talk" as a simple eco- 
nomic reason for secrecy and vagueness. Cheap 
talk illustrates an incompatibility between preci- 
sion and credibility in policy announcements 
and provides an economic explanation of why 
such announcements provide a limited, but 
still real, amount of  information. The cheap- 
talk explanation for secrecy emphasizes the 
cooperative nature of the problem. In that re- 
spect, it differs greatly from the vagueness and 
secrecy of a lazy worker hiding from his boss 
or of a junta  trying to keep its human rights 
violations from the press. Cheap talk presents 
an agency that wants to communicate, but that 
for reasons detailed below, cannot do so with 
perfect precision. 
This article presents a simple example of 
points first raised by Stein (19891, along with an 
intuitive introduction to the economic theory 
of  cheap talk. It then uses some recent advances 
to look at why Stein's arguments for secrecy 
may fail and why precise announcements 
would be u~eful.~ 
2  Other authors have suggested different reasons for vagueness 
and secrecy. See Goodfriend  (1986) and Kane (1980) for a more detailed 
examination of this issue. 
3  Signaling works, then, when its benefits outweigh its costs-  but 
things donl  always happen that way. Economists thus distinguish be- 
tween "separating" equilibria, where different types split out, and "pool- 
ing" equilibria, where everyone acts the same. See Spence (1973). 
I.  Cheap Talk and 
Communication 
"nen  you should say what you mean," 
the March Hare went on. "I do, "Alice hastily 
replied; %t least-  at least 1  mean what Isay-  " 
-Lewis  Carroll, 
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
Secrecy and vagueness describe aspects of 
communication. Consequently, any economic 
theory of  secrecy and vagueness must address 
the economics of  communication. The facet 
that appears most useful, and that I therefore 
concentrate on, is technically called cheap talk. 
, 
Cheap talk refers to unverifiable messages that 
are costless to send and receive. This stands in 
contrast to "signaling,"  a better-known eco- 
nomic theory of communication that refers to 
messages which are both costly and verifiable. 
Signaling builds on the intuition of  "put 
your money where your mouth is." The eco- 
nomics of  signaling, for instance, explain why 
a company will erect a costly headquarters to 
demonstrate its intent to stay around, or why 
skilled workers undertake the expense of  a col- 
lege education to distinguish themselves from 
less skilled workers. In each case -  construc- 
tion or education -  the costly action serves 
notice of  something important, such as depend- 
ability or quality. Every firm wishes to appear 
reliable, and every worker wishes to appear 
highly skilled. Those with a true advantage dif- 
ferentiate themselves by bearing the cost of  sig- 
naling, which acts as a device to screen out 
less desirable types3 
Cheap talk, in contrast, arises when different 
types do not wish to appear the same and when 
there is no costly investment option. An example 
here would be the classified ads. Nothing pre- 
vents me from listing a piano for sale, but it 
serves no purpose if  I really wish to sell my 
comic book collection. Likewise, a SBF (single 
black female) would most likely not list herself as 
a DJM  (divorced Jewish male), though in princi- 
ple she could. 
More abstractly, the communication envi- 
sioned by cheap-talk theory involves a sender 
and a receiver. The sender has private informa- 
tion that matters to the receiver, who must 
choose an action. The outcome depends on 
both the sender's type (that is, the private infor- 
mation the sender has) and the action taken 
by the receiver. Thus, a receiver's action might 
be to visit my house with the intent to buy my 
comic book collection. Receiver 
Sender  Action A  Action B  Action C 
Type  a  2,3  0,o  1,2 
Type b  0,o  2,3  1,2 
-- 
SOURCE:  Adapted from Matthew~,  Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1991). 
Utility Functions 
Y 
m  mtb 
SOURCE:  Author's calculations. 
This sort of communication or coordination 
game has been justified here with rather homey 
examples of pianos, comic books, and malls, 
but it has a direct bearing on policy announce- 
ments. Consider a central bank that, for whatever 
reason (internal politics, the latest economic re- 
search), has a particular position on how much 
banks should rely on discount-window borrow- 
ing for short-term liquidity. An easy central 
bank, would let banks borrow substantial 
amounts at short notice. Banks, if  they knew 
this, would want to structure their loan portfo- 
lios to exploit this possibility. A tough central 
bank would discourage lending, and if  banks 
were aware of  that, they would not want to be 
caught short. In this case, it benefits the central  - 
bank to communicate its position to the banks 
-  that is, to declare whether it is type a  (easy) 
or type b  (tough) in the game of  figure 1. 
To take another example, a regulator may 
look at low-capitalized financial institutions, 
such as savings and loans, and decide how it 
wants to deal with their risky investments. 
One type of  regulator may prefer to prosecute 
management vigorously for undertaking what it 
deems to be inappropriate risks, while another 
type may view denying those investments as 
an unfair hardship on a well-run organization. 
Clearly, it matters to the thrift owners -  and to 
their investment strategy -  which position the 
regulator takes. Just as clearly, the regulator is 
much more likely to get its way by talking 
cheaply and revealing its type to the industry. 
The classified ad example pinpoints one big 
advantage of  cheap talk: coordination. It wastes 
everyone's time if aspiring pianists, rather than 
X-men aficionados, come to my house. Like- 
wise, agreeing on a place to meet if one gets 
separated from a group of  friends at the mall 
gives another simple example of the advan- 
tages of cheap talk as coordination. 
Table 1 describes the coordination role of 
cheap talk in the fonnalism of  game theory. The 
sender may be type a  or type 6, while the re- 
ceiver may take action A, B, or C. The first num- 
ber of  each pair denotes the payoff  to the sender; 
the second is the payoff to the receiver. If  the 
sender does not send a message about his type, 
the receiver takes action C, because the certain 
payoff of  2 beats the average of  1.5 from choos- 
ing A or B in ignorance. The sender, however, 
has an incentive to send a message -  and to 
send the truth -  because delivering the wrong 
message hurts the sender as well as the receiver. 
If  a type a  sender announces "I'm type b," then 
both the sender and receiver get zero.4 
11.  Secrecy and 
Vagueness: The 
Partition Equilibrium 
Men use ... speech only to conceal 
their thoughts. 
-Voltaire,  Dialogue 14, 
Le  Chapon et la Poularde 
In the previous section, cheap talk served a coor- 
dinating role, being both credible and precise. 
Vagueness and secrecy had no place. This 
section describes a more subtle effect in which 
4  Even in this simple example, things are not as straightforward as 
they seem. For example, another cheap-talk equilibrium exists in which the 
receiver ignores all messages, and hence the sender can report any arbitrary 
message. Game theorists accurately describe this as the babbling equilib- 
rium, which points out another difficulty with cheap-talk games: They often 
have several equilibria, only one of which may have the desired properties. 
The example also leaves unspecified the language of the messages, whether 
verbal, code, or the number of  lamps left in the tower of  Boston's  Old North 
Church. Readers interested in a deeper treatment of these issues should con- 
sult Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara,  and Postlewaite (1991). precision and credibility conflict with each 
other, leading to secrecy and vague policy pro- 
nouncements. 
The increased subtlety of this result also re- 
quires a more formal approach. Let the sender 
be the bank regulator and the receiver be a 
bank or the banking system. The regulator has 
a preferred risk level for banks that strikes 
some balance between safety and profitability 
and that takes into account the cost of  a bail- 
out. This preferred risk level, denoted m and 
distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, deter- 
mines the sender's type, but is unknown to the 
bank. The bank, perhaps because it does not 
internalize the cost of the safety net provided 
by the regulator (or perhaps because it under- 
stands the risks better), prefers to undertake 
more risk. The regulators know the extent of 
this bias, denoted b. The bank must put to- 
gether a loan portfolio with risk level y, also 
falling somewhere between 0 and 1. 
The regulator's utility is 
The bank's utility is 
2 
(2)  UB=-(y-[m+  b])  . 
Figure 1  illustrates these functions. Reflecting the 
difference in preferred risk levels, equation (1) 
has a maximum at y  = m, while equation (2) has 
a maximum at y  = m + b. The bank and the regu- 
lator know each other's utility function. 
Equations (1) and (2) embody several impor- 
tant assumptions. First, the interests of  the regu- 
lator and the bank are not perfectly aligned. 
Nonetheless, the bank does care about what the 
regulator chooses, since a bank far from the regu- 
lator's preferred risk level may face increasingly 
intrusive regulation. In the terminology of  Buser, 
Chen, and Kane (1980, the regulatory tax be- 
comes more and more burdensome as the bank's 
risk deviates further from the regulator's preferred 
level. For example, although increasing risk may 
boost the bank's income, the higher regulatory 
taxes could mean that profits will drop. 
Items falling under the regulator's discretion 
include the handling of  branch and merger 
proposals, the extent and thoroughness of  ex- 
aminations, and, in extreme cases of failure, 
lawsuits or overly stringent regulation. Such 
procedures may mean the difference between 
current managers remaining in place during a 
reorganization, a new management team being 
brought in, or even prosecution for malfeasance. 
Making this problem nontrivial is the private 
nature of  m. Only the government agency ob- 
serves m, which reflects either the regulator's 
exact feelings, some bureaucratic/political out- 
come, or economic analysis based on confiden- 
tial inputs, such as BOPEC or CAMEL  ratings.5 
It is possible that this value changes over time, 
with new administrations and new appoint- 
ments. Formally speaking, in the model pre- 
sented here, the level of  m is given to the 
government by such a process, rather than be- 
ing freely chosen. 
Equally important, the regulator wishis to 
communicate its m type -  it doesn't just  want 
to make all banks think that it is tough. For ex- 
ample, a regulator with a low m views banks 
investing a large share of  deposits in safe T-bills 
as prudent. A regulator with a high m  views 
such banks as lending too little. As  Stein (1989) 
puts it, "Not all types want to create the same 
expectations" (p. 36). Hence, regulators want 
to let banks know the level of  m6 
Now we are in a position to discuss secrecy 
and vagueness. We must proceed, however, in 
a way that may seem backwards. That is, we 
start with the answer and then show that it 
works. Specifically, a particular type of vague- 
ness, announcing a range of  m  rather than a 
specific value, solves the credibility problem. 
In game-theoretic terminology, we conjecture 
an equilibrium and show our conjecture to be 
colrect. Though economically and logically pre- 
cise, this approach is unsatisfying -  a bit like 
knowing that 17 x 17 is 289 without knowing 
how to extract square roots. 
With these preliminaries out of the way, we 
can understand how vagueness and secrecy 
play a role. Suppose, as in the earlier examples, 
that the regulator notices the coordination as- 
pect of the problem and announces m. The 
bank, however, believes that a slightly higher 
risk level is appropriate and, knowing m, 
chooses a risk of y = m + b. The regulator 
doesn't like this, so instead of  announcing m, 
it announces m -  b, figuring that when the 
bank increases its risk above the announced 
m, it will return to the risk level most preferred 
by the regulator. But the bank isn't stupid. It 
knows that the regulator wants to understate 
W  5  BOPEC ratings  apply to bank holding companies, while CAMEL rat- 
ings apply to banks. Both are confidential  assessments of these institutions' 
health filed by their regulators.  See Spong (1990) for additional details. 
W  6  In Stein's model of monetary policy, some distortion (caused 
either by the government or by a market imperfection) means that the 
monetary authority wishes to fool people and drive down the unemploy- 
ment rate. The imperfect correlation of interests thus takes a slightly dif- 
ferent form than in this paper. m, so it overstates y  even more. Understanding 
&us, the regulator wants to understate m  further 
yet, meaning that the bank adjusts risky up 
even more, meaning that the regulator .... Obvi- 
ously, credibly communicating m proves irnpos- 
sible. Because the regulator has an incentive to 
manipulate banks' expectations, it cannot credibly 
and precisely announce its preferred risk level. 
Divergent interests make this impossible.' 
Banks and regulators have similar, but not 
identical, interests. This makes communication 
desirable, but precise announcements useless. On 
the other hand, it makes imprecise -  or vague 
-  announcements useful. Suppose that instead 
of  announcing that the preferred risk for banks is 
m = 0.57721, the regulator simply announces 
whether its preferred risk is high, medium, or 
low. Because interests are not identical, the regu- 
lator wants to manipulate banks' expectations. 
However, because interests are similar, a regula- 
tor with a hgh preferred risk (large m)  will not 
manipulate expectations too far. It will not want 
to tell banks that its preferred risk is in the low 
category, since the difference is just  too large. 
With only three choices, the coordination side of 
communication becomes more important than 
the manipulation side. The regulator in effect 
commits itself to not telling little white lies - 
only big lies are possible. And whde the regulator 
wishes that its hard-charging loan machine would 
take a little less risk, it really doesn't want the 
bank to become a conservative bond investor. 
More formally, consider the regulator an- 
nouncing a "partition" of three intervals [O, a,], 
[a,,  a,], and la,, 11. (For completeness, I define 
the first and last terms as ao=  0 and a3=1.) 
Whenever m  falls between 0 and a,, the regu- 
lator announces that it favors low risk, or that 
m  is in the interval [O, a,]. 
For any such announcement, the bank, know- 
ing m  has a uniform distribution, makes a best 
a,+ a,+,  guess of  it as  and consequently 
chooses its risk level as 
The bank pushes up its risk level by  b from its 
best guess of  the regulator's true m. For exam- 
ple, whenever m falls between 0 and a,, the 
bank sets 
In order to show that this vagueness tactic 
actually works, we need to be more specific 
and calculate the a,'s, or the boundaries for 
each region. It must be true that if  m falls in 
the interval [ai,  a,  + ,I,  the regulator prefers to 
announce that particular interval rather than 
any other. 
At  the boundaries, an arbitrage condition 
holds: The regulator, with a target risk level of 
m = a, , must be indifferent between announc- 
ing interval [a,  - ,,  a,  I  or [a,,  a,, ,  I. From equa- 
tions (1) and (3), this condition becomes 
a,-  + a, 
=-( 
2 
2  + b-a,) 
Equation (4)  reduces to a difference equation 
having the form a,, ,  = 2ai -  a,-, -  4b, subject 
to a,=Oanda3=1. 
Standard methods exist to solve such differ- 
ence equations (see Goldberg [19581),  and us- 
ing them delivers the results 
1  a --+4b  and 
'-3 
1  If  we set b  = 5  then the three intervals (or 
1  15  partitions) become low = [ 0, -  I, medium = [ -,  -1, 
5  2 
and high = IT, 11. Notice the asymmetry i:  tkis 
partition equilibrium. The intervals are not all 
the same size, meaning that the regulator can be 
more precise when its preferred risk level ex- 
1  ceeds the mean (that is, when m > ?). Because 
the bank tends to set risk above what the regu- 
lator prefers, the regulator can use the natural 
endpoint, m = 1, to create a more precise an- 
nouncement. The result is that announcements 
will be vaguer and secrecy will be higher when 
the regulator's risk is relatively low. 
These numbers make the example particu- 
larly simple, but the main points carry through 
in general. The number and size of the parti- 
tions may vary as the exact trade-off between 
coordination and manipulation changes. Thus, 
partitions remain, as does the asymmetry be- 
tween them. 
To summarize, the regulator wishes to com- 
municate its preferred risk level to the bank. 
The gaming caused by the bank desiring more 
7  This scenario assumes that the interaction is a one-shot game. 
Considering repeated interactions between the bank and the regulator may 
lead to different results, but only, as Stein (1989) notes, under very strong 
assumptions. 
8  This analysis closely follows Crawiord and Sobel (1982). Banks 
choosey to maximize their expected utility, given by equation (2). risk than does the regulator means that any 
precise announcement will not be credible. The 
partition equilibrium, on the other hand, deliv- 
ers a credible announcement that is not precise. 
Ill. Small Lies 
and Small Banks 
Striving to better, oft we mar what's well. 
-William  Shakespeare, 
King Lear 
(Act I, sc. iv, line 371) 
The partition equilibrium provides an intuitive 
justification for secrecy and vagueness. It repre- 
sents a way to communicate credibly when inter- 
ests are sdar  but not identical. A closer look at 
the reasoning involved, however, casts some 
doubt on the general applicability of  the results. 
Because an exacting analysis of the criticisms 
would involve some highly technical aspects in- 
appropriate for an Economic Rm'ew, this section 
concentrates on economic intuition instead. 
The first problem concerns how the regulator 
(sender) tries to influence the receiver. In the par- 
tition example, if the regulator announces that it 
prefers medium risk, the bank guesses that 
2  11  5  2  m=-(becau~e~[~+~]=-)  and chooses a 
3  3 
2  1  17  risk level of y = -  + -  = -  This response may  3  24  24  ' 
tempt the regulator into announcing a "revised 
5  5  message of  "m  is in the interval (12,  z)."  If  the 
bank reasons as before, this will lead to a risk 
16  level of y = 2. 
The bank may not reason as before, how- 
ever. The original partition equilibrium defined 
the ranges, but what if  the sender changes the 
announced range? What does the bank believe 
when the regulator does something unexpected? 
This puts the economist in the uncomfortable 
position of  playing psychologist. It also makes 
the ultimate result somewhat uncertain. For ex- 
ample, if  the bank recognizes what the regula- 
tor is doing with the revised announcement, it 
will shade its choice of y  somewhat higher, 
the regulator will shade the interval lower, and 
the partition equilibrium will break down. As 
the originator of  this critique explains, "The 
cheap-talk equilibrium breaks down entirely if 
small differences in government announce- 
ments can cause only small differences in pub- 
lic expectations" (Conlon [19941,  p. 420). 
An  unexpected announcement can have 
various ~onse~uences.~  when the regulator 
5  5  announces that m is in the interval (~6)'  the 
bank may believe, "Things are totally fouled 
up. We'd better assume that m = f ." Such a be- 
lief will once again allow the partition equilib- 
rium to exist. That is, the regulator realizes that 
any deviation from the standard announcement 
could lead to an undesirably large change in 
bank expectations. In this case, because the 
bank becomes too conservative, it would be 
better for the regulator to stay with its original 
three announcements. 
Another critical assumption is that the regula- 
tor faces only one bank, or a completely homo- 
geneous banking system that acts like one bank. 
If, instead, many banks each have different pre- 
ferred risk levels (b,'s), problems can once again 
arise. In this case, if the regulator makes an unex- 
pected announcement, the average of the poten- 
tially dfierent responses may lead to a smooth 
response. Any big sh~fts  get averaged out, and 
the equilibrium again unravels.1° 
Put another way, with a large audience, the 
sender has an incentive to "fine tune" the aver- 
age audience reaction. This leads receivers to 
attempt to offset the anticipated fine tuning, 
and communication breaks down. 
IV.  Conclusion 
He was a power politically fer years, but 
he never got prominent enough t' have his 
speeches garbled. 
-Abe  Martin, 
Abe Martin's Sayings and Sketches 
How much detail a government should com- 
municate to its citizens remains controversial, 
especially in the areas of  money and banking. 
On many issues, the government communicates 
to foster coordination with the public. There 
are simply some things it is useful for citizens 
to know, and the government tells them. In 
other cases where interests may not align ex- 
actly, communication cannot always be both 
precise and credible. Vagueness and secrecy 
present one way around the problem by allow- 
ing partial communication. 
The conflict between credibility and precision 
suggests that pressuring an agency to release 
information may not always be productive. Re- 
leasing bank regulators' meeting notes or 
9  This is the problem of  multiple equilibria,  mentioned in footnote 4. 
10  See Conlon (1992). The detailed argument is quite complex. videotaping FOMC  deliberations will most 
likely result in reports and videotapes display- 
ing the lamented vagueness of current official 
releases. The partition equilibrium remains the 
optimal solution to the problem facing the 
government and the public; videotaping will 
not change the trade-off between vagueness 
and credibility. 
Pressure may result in truthful, precise an- 
nouncements if  it leads to an appropriate 
change in institutional structure. The change 
must somehow further align the interests of 
the two parties or introduce a credible commit- 
ment mechanism. Less drastic changes, per- 
haps occurring as agencies come to grips with 
the trade-offs involved, may alter the amount 
of information released. The FOMC's recent 
policy announcements are a case in point." 
These conclusions should be treated with a 
healthy skepticism, however. As  we have seen, 
further examination of the economic issues re- 
veals that the benefits of vagueness may be 
sensitive to particular modeling assumptions. 
Cheap talk represents an intriguing, but not 
entirely compelling, justification for imprecise 
policy announcements. 
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